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The financing of the U.S. economy’s capital formation has been a major 
subject of business and public policy discussion for more than a decade 
and a major focus of empirical inquiry by the National Bureau of  Eco- 
nomic Research over a much longer time. Even in the 1950s and 1960s’ for 
example, the National Bureau conducted a series of “Studies in Capital 
Formation and Financing,” which culminated in Simon Kuznets’ impor- 
tant volume, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Fi- 
nancing. Earlier still, the National Bureau conducted a series of  “Studies 
in Business Finance” and “Studies in Corporate Bond Financing.” 
This focus on the financing of capital formation is an appropriate one, 
no less so today than then. The central importance of capital formation to 
the economy’s further growth and development is broadly recognized, 
and physical  investment decisions and their  financial counterparts are 
fundamentally interdependent. The financial environment therefore in- 
fluences both the amount and the composition of the capital formation 
that an economy like that of the United States undertakes. 
Questions about capital formation in the United States, and especially 
about the financing of  that capital formation, inevitably focus in large 
part on the economy’s corporate  sector. Since World War 11, business cor- 
porations have consistently accounted for about three-quarters of all in- 
vestment in plant and equipment in the United States. The economic be- 
havior of the corporate sector, including corporations’ physical investment 
decisions as well as their corresponding financial decisions, constitutes a 
primary determinant of the economy’s overall capital formation process 
and performance. 
Benjamin M. Friedman is professor of economics at Harvard University and program di- 
rector for Financial Markets and Monetary Economics at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
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The papers in this volume summarize the principal findings of the sec- 
ond stage of a current, wide-ranging National Bureau effort to investigate 
“The Changing Roles of Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital For- 
mation.” The first group of  studies sponsored under this project, which 
were published individually and summarized in a 1982  volume bearing the 
same title (Friedman 1982), took a broad-based view of the evolving fi- 
nancial underpinnings of U.S. capital formation, addressing not only cor- 
porate sector behavior but also such issues as household saving incentives, 
international capital flows, and government debt management. The proj- 
ect’s second series of  studies, published together in 1985 under the title 
Corporate Capital Structures in  the United States (Friedman 1985), fo- 
cused more narrowly on capital formation undertaken by the U.S. corpo- 
rate business sector.’ At the same time, because corporations’ securities 
must be held, a parallel focus in this second stage of the research was on 
the behavior of the markets that price the financial claims which the cor- 
porate sector issues. 
The financial capital structure of  an economy’s business corporations, 
either individually or in the aggregate, is the joint product of decisions taken 
by  claim-issuing  corporations  and  claim-holding investors-collectively, 
“the market.”  The capital structure existing at any one time reflects the 
cumulative result  of  the entire prior history of  corporate decisions on 
what kind of claims to  issue, and how much of each, in response to the as- 
sociated  history  of the relevant  market prices.  Changes in the capital 
structure over time therefore reflect corporate responses either to chang- 
ing nonfinancial influences or to changes in the financial market environ- 
ment, which in turn stem from investors’ responses to a wide variety of 
further economic and noneconomic factors. The main goals motivating 
the research in the second stage of this National Bureau project was not 
only to advance understanding of the basic corporate-sector  behavior 
connecting debt and equity financing to physical capital formation in the 
United States, but also, and more specifically, to assess how the roles of 
debt and equity in this process have changed over time. 
Within this overall direction, three sets of  questions about corporate 
sector and financial market behavior directly framed the research under- 
taken in these papers: First, what has been the actual experience of the use 
of  debt  and  equity financing  by  U.S. business  corporations in  recent 
years? Second, what factors drive the financial markets’ pricing of-that 
is, the setting of terms on which investors are willing to hold-debt  and 
equity securities? And third, what is the relationship (if any) between cor- 
porations’ real investment decisions and their financial decisions? Ten pa- 
pers addressing these questions, written by eighteen researchers, consti- 
tuted the second stage of this National Bureau project. 
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The papers in this volume are the authors’ summaries of six of those ten 
papers. These six papers were prepared for a conference for corporate and 
financial sector practitioners that the National Bureau sponsored at Wil- 
liamsburg, Virginia, on September 20-21,  1984. The conference itself pro- 
vided an opportunity for the participating researchers to report their find- 
ings to, and receive valuable feedback from, an audience consisting of 
senior corporate sector financial executives and senior executives of fi- 
nancial firms. The six papers presented at that conference, and published 
here for the first time, provide an overview of the second stage of this Na- 
tional Bureau project, which is now complete. 
The first three of the ten papers comprising this stage of the project es- 
tablished the basic empirical facts of the changes that have (and, in some 
cases, have not) taken place in U.S. corporate capital structures and in the 
financial price and yield relationships that U.S. corporations have faced 
in recent years. 
Robert A. Taggart’s paper,  “Secular Patterns in Corporate Finance, ” 
set the stage for the entire series of studies by first developing a conceptual 
framework for thinking about changes in corporate capital structures and 
then assembling and analyzing relevant time series data going back in 
many cases to the beginning of the twentieth century. Taggart began by us- 
ing available aggregate time series data to document the main features of 
the changes that have occurred over time. He showed that the use of debt 
by U.S.  corporations has increased considerably since World War 11, as is 
familiar, but also that current debt levels are not necessarily high by pre- 
war standards. The postwar surge in corporate debt certainly appears less 
dramatic when viewed  in the context of the whole century’s experience. 
Taggart also documented several other changes that have occurred, in- 
cluding the increasing importance of  short-term  relative to long-term 
debt, and the declining importance of new issues of either common or pre- 
ferred stock relative to internally generated equity. 
In his paper’s more theoretical sections, Taggart reviewed several basic 
explanations of  the determination  of  firm and/or aggregate corporate 
capital structures, including those relying on the trade-off between bank- 
ruptcy costs and tax savings from deductibility of interest payments, on 
the relative agency costs of debt and equity, on problems of providing rel- 
evant information to security holders,  and on the differential between 
personal and corporate tax rates. Taggart laid out the relationships among 
these four separate approaches and used them to examine a series of po- 
tential influences on corporate capital structures including tax factors, 
price inflation, supplies of competing securities, and the physical charac- 
teristics of corporate investment. 
Taggart then went on to ask which among these different explanations 
could plausibly account for the main changes that have taken place. He 
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important role, but nevertheless not one sufficient to explain the chief 
trends that have occurred over long periods of time. He  argued that, in ad- 
dition,  supplies of  competing securities like government  bonds,  along 
with the secular development of the nation’s financial intermediary sys- 
tem, may also be important determinants of long-run corporate financing 
patterns. 
Taggart’s  paper,  “Have  U.S.  Corporations  Grown  Financially 
Weak?”, which appears as Chapter 1 of this volume, summarizes the chief 
findings of this extensive work. 
John H. Ciccolo and Christopher F.  Baum’s paper,  “Changes in the 
Balance  Sheet of  the U.S.  Manufacturing  Sector,  1926-1977,”  took a 
closer look at an important slice of the corporate sector’s capital struc- 
ture on the basis of a new data series developed as part of this National 
Bureau project and now available to other researchers. Ciccolo and Baum 
developed a new data series for a rolling sample of approximately 50 man- 
ufacturing firms, spanning a half-century  and including for each firm a 
large number of balance sheet and income account items. A major contri- 
bution of this data set is the ready availability, for the first time, of accu- 
rate information on the market value of corporations’ publicly traded lia- 
bilities.  In addition, the data set Ciccolo and Baum developed provides 
estimates of  the replacement  value of firms’ physical  assets, as well as 
computations of rates of return based on both market and replacement 
values. 
Ciccolo and Baum showed that the chief aggregate features exhibited 
by this data set over time are broadly consistent with the principal devel- 
opments documented at the aggregate level by other researchers. The data 
show an increasing importance of external funds, and especially of debt, 
in financing corporations’ physical capital formation. On the asset side, 
the data show a substantial decline in corporations’ holdings of cash and 
short-term marketable securities. Rates of return have declined on bal- 
ance within the post-World  War I1 period, but not from the perspective of 
a longer time frame. In the latter half of the postwar period, market valu- 
ations of corporations’ net assets have declined dramatically in relation 
either to replacement values or to  realized rates of return. 
As an illustration of its potential applications, Ciccolo and Baum used 
the 1927-35 and 1966-77 panels of their data set to examine the relation- 
ship of movements of corporations’ key balance sheet items to  changes in 
their net cash flow and to changes in the ratio of market to replacement 
value of their net assets. The principal idea at issue here is that firms face 
different constraints, and therefore behave differently, when they are at- 
tempting to  increase their stock of physical capital than when they are try- 
ing to  reduce it. The empirical results that Ciccolo and Baum found gener- 
ally support this kind of relationship for the later (more normal) period, 
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Patric H. Hendershott and Roger D. Huang’s paper, “Debt and Equity 
Yields, 1926-1980,”  provided a parallel review and analysis of the market 
prices and yields that U.S. corporations have faced in deciding on their 
capital structures. Hendershott and Huang first documented the principal 
movements of  and interrelationships among debt and equity yields in the 
United States over a half-century, including both  secular and cyclical 
movements. They then went on to test several familiar propositions about 
these yield relationships. 
Hendershott and Huang focused in the first instance on corporate bond 
and equity yields, the market prices most directly relevant to capital struc- 
ture decisions, but for purposes of  analysis and comparison their work 
also included the yields on both short- and long-term U.S. Treasury secu- 
rities. A familiar result, which their review of the experience of these yields 
reinforced, is the contrast between the patterns that have dominated the 
post-World War I1 period and the events of the 1930s. A less familiar re- 
sult, which emerged strongly in their work nevertheless, is the appearance 
of strong regularities in security yield movements over the business cycle, 
including systematic differences in the cyclical movements of ex post re- 
turns on bonds and equities. The strength of  equity returns during the 
year surrounding business cycle troughs stands out especially clearly. 
Hendershott and Huang also investigated several familiar hypotheses 
about the determination of debt and equity yields. The principal conclu- 
sion of their work here is that unanticipated price inflation, which they re- 
presented by the difference between the actual inflation experience and 
the corresponding estimate in the Livingston survey, is a major determi- 
nant of these yields. Other factors also emerged from their analysis as 
bearing on the determination of  yields, however-including,  in particu- 
lar, measures of  real economic activity like industrial production and ca- 
pacity utilization. 
Hendershott’s paper, “Debt and Equity Returns Revisited,” which ap- 
pears as Chapter 2 of this volume, summarizes and extends this work. 
Against the background of this general review of the experience of both 
the quantities and the prices associated with changes in corporate capital 
structures in the United States, the next four papers addressed more di- 
rectly the market mechanism determining the prices and yields on debt 
and equity securities. Of these four, the first two focused on more general 
aspects of the behavior of investors in debt and equity securities, while the 
next two examined the market pricing mechanism in contexts more spe- 
cifically related to actual or potential changes in corporate capital struc- 
tures. 
Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, and Robert McDonald’s paper, “Inflation and 
the Role of Bonds in Investor Portfolios,” explored both theoretically and 
empirically the role of nominal (that is, not indexed) bonds of various ma- 
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sis was to determine whether an investor constrained to hold bonds only in 
the form of a single portfolio  of nominal debt instruments-as  is the case, 
for example, in employer-sponsored saving plans  offering a choice be- 
tween a common stock fund and a single bond fund-will  suffer a serious 
welfare loss. For this purpose Bodie and his colleagues took as their mea- 
sure of welfare gain or loss, due to  a given change in the investor’s oppor- 
tunity set, the increment to the investor’s current wealth needed to offset 
that change. A second goal of their analysis was to study the desirability 
and feasibility of introducing a market for indexed bonds, offering a risk- 
less real return, in the United States. 
Bodie and his colleagues used the risk structure of real returns computed 
from historical data for 1953-81, in combination with assumptions about 
net asset supplies and about investors’ average degree of risk aversion, to 
derive estimates of the risk premia on the various assets they studied. 
From this procedure they concluded that a substantial loss in welfare can 
be associated with participation in a savings plan offering a choice only 
between a diversified common stock fund and an intermediate-term bond 
fund. They argued that it is possible to eliminate most of this loss, however, 
by introducing, as a third option in such plans, a fund consisting of short- 
term money market instruments. Bodie et al. also concluded that the po- 
tential welfare gain from introducing explicitly indexed bonds in the U.S. 
financial market is probably not large enough to justify the costs of inno- 
vation by private issuers. The major reason the gain would be so small is 
that 1-month U.S. Treasury bills, with their small variance of real returns, 
already constitute an effective substitute for indexed bonds in investors’ 
portfolios. 
“Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity,” which appears as 
Chapter 3 of this volume, summarizes this work by Bodie et al. and ap- 
plies it to help explain why real interest rates have been so high in recent 
years in the United States. Their principal conclusion is that the increased 
volatility of  bond prices since the 1979  change in the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem’s operating procedures has substantially increased the required risk 
premium on long-term bonds. By  contrast, they consider but reject the 
possibility that increased risk alone accounts for the recent high level of 
U.S. short-term interest rates. 
My own paper, “The Substitutability of Debt and Equity Securities,” 
investigated  empirically the degree to which investors in U.S.  markets 
consider debt and equity as substitutes in their portfolios-an  aspect of 
investors’ behavior that has an important influence on, among other mat- 
ters, whether government deficits “crowd out” private financing and pri- 
vate capital formation. The analysis first applied fundamental relation- 
ships connecting portfolio choices with expected asset returns to infer key 
asset substitutabilities directly from the risk structure of U.S. asset returns 
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corresponding estimates obtained from data on the actual portfolio be- 
havior of U.S. households. 
The resulting evidence provided little ground for any conclusion about 
even the sign, much less the magnitude, of the substitutability of  short- 
term debt and equity. Although the risk structure indicated that these two 
assets are substitutes, observed household portfolio behavior indicated 
that investors have treated them as complements. By  contrast, the evi- 
dence consistently indicated that long-term debt and equity are substi- 
tutes, albeit with a small degree of substitutability. This analysis therefore 
bears mixed implications for broader substantive economic and financial 
questions. 
My  paper,  “Implications of  Government Deficits for Interest Rates, 
Equity Returns and Corporate Financing,” which appears as Chapter 4 of 
this volume, summarizes parts of this work and applies it to consider the 
crowding-out question explicitly. The results indicate that government fi- 
nancing raises expected debt returns relative to expected equity returns, 
regardless of  the maturity of  the government’s financing.  Continuing 
large government deficits at full employment therefore lead to market in- 
centives for individual business corporations to emphasize reliance on eq- 
uity (including retentions),  and reduce reliance on debt, in comparison 
with the composition of corporate financing that would prevail in the ab- 
sence of the need to finance the government’s deficit. 
Wayne H. Mikkelson’s paper,  “Capital  Structure  Change  and  De- 
creases in Stockholders’ Wealth: A Cross- sectional Study of Convertible 
Security Calls,” examined the financial markets’ pricing of corporate se- 
curities in the specific context of the changes in common stock values that 
occur when firms call outstanding convertible debt or preferred stock. 
Mikkelson’s goals were to investigate the potential determinants of  the 
usually observed negative common stock price reaction to the announce- 
ment of a convertible security call forcing conversion and, on the basis of 
this analysis, to draw inferences about the pricing of corporate securities 
and hence about the determination of corporate capital structures more 
generally. 
Mikkelson’s empirical work related the observed changes in common 
stock prices following 164 convertible security calls made by U.S. corpo- 
rations  during  1962-78  to several  quantifiable  effects associated with 
these calls-including  the change in interest expense tax shields, the po- 
tential redistribution of wealth from common stockholders to holders of 
debt or preferred stock, the decrease in value of  the conversion option 
held by owners of the convertible securities, the increase in the number of 
common  shares  outstanding,  and  the  change  in  earnings  per  share. 
Among these various effects, only the reduction in interest expense tax 
shields exhibited a significant relationship to the change in common stock 
price. 8  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Mikkelson argued that this result is consistent with systematic reduc- 
tions in common stock prices due not only to reductions in interest ex- 
pense tax shields, as would be implied by theories relating optimal capital 
structure to tax factors, but also to the negative information about corpo- 
rations’  earnings prospects conveyed by  convertible security calls.  He 
therefore concluded that this evidence is  also consistent with theories 
which relate a corporation’s capital structure to its earnings prospects, 
and hence which imply that a reduction in leverage conveys unfavorable 
information about the corporation’s value. 
E. Philip Jones, Scott P. Mason, and Eric Rosenfeld’s paper, “Contin- 
gent Claims Valuation of  Corporate Liabilities: Theory and Empirical 
Tests,” addressed the specific question of how the financial markets value 
the complicated securities, encumbered by numerous covenants and in- 
denture provisions, that U.S.  corporations typically issue. The central 
tool in their analysis is the familiar contingent claims model, which ap- 
plies to the pricing of corporate liabilities the fundamental insight that 
every corporate security is a contingent claim on the value of the underly- 
ing firm. Hence it is possible to model the financial markets’ pricing of 
these securities via an arbitrage logic that is independent of other, less 
straightforward aspects of the structure of risk and return. Under this use- 
ful model, the price of every security depends in a formally quantifiable 
way on the rate of return on riskless assets and on the issuing firm’s mar- 
ket value and the volatility of that value. 
Jones and his colleagues laid out the basic contingent claims model, ex- 
tended it to cover such practically relevant special cases as multiple debt 
issues of a single firm and debt issues with sinking funds (with and without 
an option to double the associated payment schedule), and then tested the 
expanded model using monthly 1975-82 data on the actual market prices 
of  177 bonds issued by  15 U.S. corporations. They concluded that their 
empirical results do not  warrant  using the model,  in its conventional 
form, as a practical basis for valuing corporate securities. Although there 
is almost no systematic bias in the pricing errors that the model makes for 
the sample as a whole, the model does systematically over- or underprice 
bonds with specific characteristics. In particular, the model tends to un- 
derprice less risky bonds and overprice more risky bonds. This failure led 
Jones and his colleagues to suggest that several of the standard assump- 
tions underlying contingent claims analysis in its usual form are inconsis- 
tent with the actual workings of the U.S. financial markets. 
Mason’s  paper,  “Valuing  Financial  Flexibility,”  which  appears  as 
Chapter 5 of this volume, summarizes this work and extends it to demon- 
strate the impact of changing interest rate volatility on the value of call 
provisions and call protection. 
The last three papers in this second stage of the research returned to a 
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now emphasizing in particular the question of the relationship (if any) of 
capital structure decisions to corporations’ real-sector behavior. 
Michael S. Long and Ileen S. Malitz’s paper, “Investment Patterns and 
Financial Leverage,” focused on one of the major elements underlying fa- 
miliar theories of  corporate capital structures: the role of  investment op- 
portunities.  An important  implication of  such models is that corpora- 
tions’ real and financial decisions are connected. In this case the connection 
takes the form of a systematic bias toward underinvestment when firms 
with risky debt outstanding act in the interest of their shareholders. One 
potential role of complex covenants in debt contracts is to alleviate this 
problem. 
Long and Malitz argued that, because growth opportunities that are 
firm-specific and intangible (and hence unobservable) reduce the effec- 
tiveness of debt covenants, corporations with a high proportion of their 
investment opportunities in intangible form can limit the agency costs im- 
posed on holders of  their debt only by limiting the amount of risky debt 
they have outstanding. Conversely, by using appropriately structured debt 
covenants, corporations with a high proportion of  their investment op- 
portunities in the form of tangible assets like capital equipment can re- 
duce these costs and therefore can support a greater level of debt. Hence a 
key determinant of the corporation’s optimal capital structure is the spe- 
cific type of investment opportunity it faces. 
Long and Malitz presented empirical results, based on 1978-80 data for 
a sample of  545 U.S. corporations, that provide evidence in support of 
such a relationship between real and financial corporate behavior. In par- 
ticular, their results show that corporations that invest heavily in intangi- 
bles-research  and development, for example, or advertising-systemati- 
cally rely less on debt than do corporations that invest largely in tangibles. 
These results also stand up in the presence of other variables like tax fac- 
tors that represent alternative explanations of capital structure decisions, 
although there is evidence that the most important single determinant of 
corporations’ borrowing  decisions remains the  availability of  internal 
funds. 
Michael Spence’s paper,  “Capital  Structure and  the  Corporation’s 
Product Market Environment,” examined the potential relationship be- 
tween corporations’ real and financial behavior from a different perspec- 
tive. Spence argued that, if choosing an optimal capital structure is a way 
for a corporation to reduce its costs in some relevant sense, then corpora- 
tions facing greater competitive pressure in their product  markets will 
have a greater incentive, and hence a greater tendency, to do so than will 
corporations enjoying more sheltered competitive environments. Alterna- 
tively, if theories treating financial structure as irrelevant are correct, then 
there would be no observed connection between competitive product mar- 
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Spence tested this hypothesis by relating the observed interfirm vari- 
ance of capital structures to  measures of product market competitive pres- 
sure for 1183 U.S. corporations in 403 four-digit industries. His measures 
of competitiveness included returns earned by firms as well as variables 
directly and indirectly reflecting entry barriers and potential oligopolistic 
consensus. Spence also included in the empirical work measures of prod- 
uct market diversification for each firm, so as to be able to distinguish the 
behavior of the full sample from the behavior of a smaller sample of rela- 
tively undiversified firms. 
Spence found that, although industry product market environments 
help explain the returns that firms earn and also bear systematic relation- 
ships to firms’ actual capital structures, they apparently do not much in- 
fluence intra-industry deviations of  firms’ capital structures from the re- 
spective  implied  industry  optima.  One  possible  explanation  for  this 
negative result, of course, is that capital structure does not strongly influ- 
ence corporations’ costs, or hence their total value-in  other words, that 
there exists no optimal capital structure. The positive results that emerged 
from Spence’s analysis seem inconsistent with this view, however. An al- 
ternative explanation is that, while optimal capital structures do exist, the 
factors which give rise to them simply do not become significantly more 
influential in more competitive environments. 
Finally, Alan J. Auerbach’s paper, “Real Determinants of Corporate 
Leverage,” focused on still another of the key factors underlying several 
familiar theories of optimal corporate  capital structures: the role of taxes. 
Here again, what makes such models especially interesting is that corpora- 
tions’ real and financial decisions are connected. In particular, Auerbach 
argued that the U.S. corporate income tax distorts corporations’ real- 
sector behavior, via the variation in depreciation allowances and invest- 
ment tax credit provisions across different types of physical investments, 
and also distorts financial behavior via the differential treatment of debt 
and equity returns. The object of his analysis of corporations’ real and fi- 
nancial decisions was to determine the extent to which these biases offset 
one another. 
Auerbach’s analysis began from the basic idea that corporations prefer 
to finance different physical investments in different ways. Such behavior 
would be important in this context because the conclusion that tax effects 
bias investment choices is necessarily valid only if there is a separation be- 
tween real and financial decisions. For example, if a corporation’s opti- 
mal capital structure depends on a tax advantage to debt financing which 
is dissipated by risk-related costs as the firm’s leverage increases, and if 
these risk-related costs in turn depend on the corporation’s investment 
mix, then the resulting financial bias in favor of  investing in structures 
could offset the initial tux bias in favor of  investing in equipment. 11  Financing Corporate Capital Formation 
Auerbach’s empirical work, based on 1958-77  data for a panel of  189 
U.S. corporations, suggested that observed patterns of real and financial 
behavior are only partially consistent with familiar theories of optimal 
capital structure based on tax factors and on costs connected to agency 
considerations  and  risks  of  bankruptcy.  The  effect  of  corporations’ 
growth rates on their borrowing is inconsistent with the predictions of 
models based on agency costs. In addition, although the effect of the tax 
loss carry-forward is consistent with models based on tax shields, the ef- 
fect of earnings variance is not. Auerbach also concluded that there is no 
obvious financial offset to the tax bias against investment in structures, 
since, on the whole, corporations  do not appear to  borrow more to  invest 
in structures than in equipment. 
Auerbach’s paper,  “The Economic Effects of the Corporate Income 
Tax: Changing Revenues and Changing Views,” which appears as Chap- 
ter 6 of this volume, summarizes and extends this analysis. 
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